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Abstract 
Financial regulation in South Africa changes constantly. In the 
quest to find the ideal regulatory framework for optimal consumer 
protection, rules change all the time and international trends have 
an important influence on lawmakers nationally. The Financial 
Sector Regulation Bill, also known as the "Twin Peaks" Bill, is the 
latest invention from the table of the legislature, and some expect 
this Bill to have far-reaching consequences for the financial 
services industry. The question is, of course, whether the current 
dispensation will change so quickly and so dramatically that it will 
literally be the end of the world as we know it or whether there will 
be a gradual shift in emphasis away from the so-called silo 
regulatory approach to an approach that distinguishes between 
prudential regulation on the one hand and market conduct 
regulation on the other. A further question is whether insurance as 
a financial service will change dramatically in the light of the 
expected twin peak dispensation. The purpose of this paper is to 
discuss the implications of the FSR Bill for the insurance industry. 
Instead of analysing the Bill feature for feature, the method that will 
be used in this enquiry is to identify trends and issues from 2014 
and to discuss whether the Twin Peaks model, once implemented, 
can successfully eradicate similar problems in future. The impact of 
Twin Peaks will of course have to be tested, but at this point in time 
it may be very useful to take an educated guess by using recent 
cases as examples. Recent cases before the courts, the 
Enforcement Committee and the FAIS Ombud will be discussed 
not only as examples of the most prevalent issues of the past year 
or so, but also as examples of how consumer issues and systemic 
risks are currently being dealt with and how this may change with 
the implementation of the FSR Bill. 
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1 Introduction 
The delicate balance between over-regulating and under-regulating is a 
matter that will not be settled in our time. To complicate matters, 
government has started to move away from the practice of so-called "silo" 
regulation and supervision, that focuses on supervision according to 
industry (such as banking and insurance), to a model which regulates 
according to function, for example systemic risk management and 
consumer treatment (the so-called "Twin Peaks" model).1  
The Financial Sector Regulation Bill (FSR Bill) is the first step towards the 
implementation of the Twin Peaks model. After the publication of the first 
draft bill a period was allowed for comment from 13 December 2013 to 7 
March 2014. Several comments were received on various aspects of the 
draft bill, and on matters pertaining to insurance and intermediaries. The 
Association for Savings and Investment South Africa (ASISA), the 
Financial Intermediaries Association of Southern Africa (FIA) and the 
South African Insurance Association (SAIA) made submissions on a 
number of issues, such as the definition of "financial crisis" in the draft bill. 
The revised version still does not contain a definition of "financial crisis" 
but now defines "systemic event" and "systemic risk", and chapter 2 of the 
Bill explains the Reserve Bank's powers and responsibilities in managing 
systemic risk and systemic events.2  
The second draft of the FSR Bill took a number of other comments into 
account. For instance, the Bill no longer refers to "mono and dual" 
regulation by authorities. Rather, it provides that financial product 
providers will be regulated and supervised by the Prudential Authority and 
financial service providers will resort under the Financial Sector Conduct 
Authority. Furthermore, clause 2 of the Bill defines a financial product as 
follows:  
(a) a participatory interest in a collective investment scheme;  
(b) an interest, subscription, contribution, or commitment in a pooled fund;  
(c) a long-term or a short-term policy, as defined in section 1(1) of the 
Long-term Insurance Act and section 1(1) of the Short-term Insurance 
Act, respectively;  
                                            
* Daleen Millard. B Iuris, LLB, LLM (UP), LLD (UJ). Professor of Law, Department of 
Private Law, University of Johannesburg. Email: dmillard@uj.ac.za. This paper was 
presented at the University of Johannesburg’s Annual Banking Law Update in May 
2015. I am indebted to the panel, especially Prof Moellers from Germany, for his 
insights and comments. Many thanks also to Marieke Roos for her careful editing. 
1  Gilmour 2015 http://bit.ly/1T3KeT8. 
2  National Treasury 2014 http://bit.ly/26XEGxB 3, 7. 
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(d) a benefit provided by— 
(i) a pension fund organisation as defined in section 1(1) of the Pension 
Funds Act, to the members of the organisation by virtue of 
membership; or  
(ii) a friendly society as defined in section 1(1) of the Friendly Societies 
Act, to the members of the society by virtue of membership;  
(e)  a deposit as defined in section 1(1) of the Banks Act;  
(f)  a health service benefit provided by a medical scheme as defined in 
section 1(1) of the Medical Schemes Act, 1998 (Act No. 131 of 1998);  
(g) a credit agreement;  
(h)  a facility, arrangement or system that is designated by the Minister in 
terms of subsection (2) in Regulations as being a "financial product";  
(i) any combined product containing one or more of the financial 
products referred to in paragraphs (a) to (h). 
This definition corresponds with the current definition of "financial product" 
in the Financial Advisory and Intermediary Services Act (FAIS Act).3 The 
Prudential Authority will henceforth be responsible for supervising the 
safety and soundness of financial institutions that provide financial 
products, market infrastructures or payment systems.4 Prudential oversight 
is aimed to ensure that institutions meet their financial obligations to 
customers.5  
The other peak, the Financial Sector Conduct Authority, is expected to be 
responsible for fair treatment, integrity and education, and will supervise 
services performed in relation to financial products, foreign financial 
product, securities, market infrastructure or the payment system.6 What is 
important to note is that the definition of "financial service" is (quote) 
comprehensive and differs markedly from the current definition of 
"financial service" in the FAIS Act.7 "Financial service" in the FSR Bill 
means— 
(a)  in relation to a financial product, foreign financial product, securities, 
market infrastructure or the payment system as applicable—  
(i)  promotion, marketing or distribution;  
(ii)  providing advice, recommendations or guidance;  
(iii)  dealing or making a market;  
                                            
3  Section 1(1) of the Financial Advisory and Intermediary Services Act 37 of 2002, 
"financial product". 
4  Clauses 27-29 of the Financial Sector Regulation Bill [B34-2015] (FSR Bill). 
5  The FSR Bill also allows the Minister in terms of s 215 and in accordance with s 
231(3) to designate in Regulations as a "financial product" a category or type of 
facility, arrangement, or system that is not already regulated in terms of a financial 
sector law; and cannot be designated in Regulations in terms of another financial 
sector law to be regulated in terms of that financial sector law. This designation is 
aimed at furthering the objectives of the FSR Bill. 
6  Clause 3 of the FSR Bill. 
7  The current definition in s 1(1) of the FAIS Act stipulates that a financial service 
"means any service contemplated in paragraph (a), (b) or (c) of the definition of 
'financial services provider', including any category of such services". 
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(iv)  operating or managing, or providing administration services;  
(v)  services provided in relation to credit agreements, including legal 
services;  
(vi)  services provided by payment system participants;  
(b)  providing an intermediary service as defined in section 1(1) of the 
Financial Advisory and Intermediary Services Act; 
(c)  securities services provided by a regulated person as defined in 
section 1(1) of the Financial Markets Act;  
(d)  providing credit rating services as defined in section 1(1) of the Credit 
Rating Services Act, 2012 (Act No. 24 of 2012);  
(e)  the calculation of a financial benchmark;  
(f)  services related to an interest, subscription, contribution, or 
commitment in a pooled fund;  
(g)  services related to the buying and selling of foreign exchange;  
(h)  dealing with trust property, as defined in section 1 of the Financial 
Institutions (Protection of Funds) Act, 2001 (Act No. 23 of 2001), as a 
regular feature of business;  
(i)  a service that is designated by the Minister in terms of subsection (2) 
in Regulations as a financial service. 
The purpose of this paper is to discuss the implications of the FSR Bill for 
the insurance industry. Instead of analysing the Bill feature for feature, the 
method that will be used in this enquiry is to identify trends and issues 
from 2014 and to discuss whether the Twin Peaks model, once 
implemented, can successfully eradicate similar problems in future. The 
impact of Twin Peaks will of course have to be tested, but at this point in 
time it may be very useful to take an educated guess by using recent 
cases as examples. Recent cases before the courts, the Enforcement 
Committee and the FAIS Ombud will be discussed not only as examples 
of the most prevalent issues of the past year or so, but also as examples 
of how consumer issues and systemic risks are currently being dealt with 
and how this may change with the implementation of the FSR Bill. 
PART I: CURRENT REGULATORY FRAMEWORK 
The South African insurance industry is highly regulated, which means 
that, apart from the common law, statutes, together with regulations and 
rules in terms of these statutes, are a very important source of insurance 
law. This means that in interpreting insurance contracts the starting point 
is always the applicable statute. But insurance legislation also regulates 
the way in which insurance companies should operate, and at the moment 
significant parts of the existing statutes are dedicated to these matters. In 
short, the Long-term Insurance Act (LTIA)8 and the Short-term Insurance 
                                            
8  Long-term Insurance Act 52 of 1998. 
D MILLARD  PER / PELJ 2016 (19)  5 
Act (STIA)9 regulate product-specific matters and the FAIS Act regulates 
the activities of advisors and intermediaries who sell insurance.  
1 Twin Peaks: Market conduct and the Financial Sector 
Conduct Authority 
Market conduct refers to the way in which financial services providers 
conduct their business, design and price their products, and treat their 
customers. This function is therefore primarily concerned with the 
relationship between insurance companies and policyholders and it is in 
this context that matters pertaining to advertising, compliance with product 
features and standards, claims handling and dispute resolution become 
relevant. 
The discussion that follows provides an overview of the court cases and 
Ombud decisions of 2014 and views these against the Treating Customers 
Fairly Outcomes (TCF). The discussion will start with the Ombud decisions 
and will then move on to the court cases. But first, some background on 
TCF. 
2 TCF 
A search of the FSR Bill reveals that there is no specific clause that states 
that there will be such a thing as TCF. Rather, the so-called TCF principles 
are embedded in the proposed legislation and it is evident that the conduct 
of financial institutions will henceforth be measured against TCF 
principles. A perusal of a number of clauses of the FSR Bill makes this 
evident. For instance, clause 6 of the Bill postulates that it is the object of 
the proposed act 
to achieve a financial system that works in the interests of financial customers, and 
supports balanced and sustainable economic growth in the Republic, by establishing, 
in conjunction with the other financial sector laws, a regulatory and supervisory 
framework that promotes–  
(a)  financial stability;  
(b)  the safety and soundness of financial institutions;  
(c)  the fair treatment and protection of financial customers;  
(d)  the efficiency and integrity of the financial system;  
(e)  the prevention of financial crime;  
(f)  financial inclusion; and  
(g)  confidence in the financial system. [Own emphasis.] 
                                            
9  Short-term Insurance Act 53 of 1998. 
D MILLARD  PER / PELJ 2016 (19)  6 
In addition, clause 52(a) states that the objective of the new Financial 
Sector Conduct Authority (FSCA) will be to ensure that financial 
institutions treat customers fairly10 and the functions of the FSCA are set 
out in accordance with these objectives.11  
It is in fact clause 95(1)(c)(i) that authorises the FSCA to make conduct 
standards to ensure the protection and fair treatment of financial 
customers. Furthermore, sub-clause 2(a) specifies that in order to achieve 
this purpose and the other objectives (such as financial literacy), conduct 
standards will also set out fit and proper requirements and rules relating to 
the composition, roles and responsibilities of governing bodies of financial 
institutions12 and the standards of business conduct for financial institution 
representatives or mandataries.13 The embedded value of fairness is 
further evident from clause 95(1)(f), that specifies that there will be 
standards for the "promotion, marketing, distribution of or access to 
financial products, financial services, market infrastructures or payment 
systems". Furthermore, clause 95(g) envisages standards for disclosures 
in relation to financial products and services and 95(h) for giving advice, 
recommendations or guidance to financial customers in relation to 
financial products, financial services or in relation to financial planning.  
The remainder of clause 95 makes it clear that there will be standards for 
ensuring that financial products or financial services suitable to the needs 
and circumstances of financial customers,14 that there are standards for 
financial products or financial services,15 and that there are standards for 
contracts.16 
While the current legal status of TCF is debatable,17 it is a fact that TCF is 
the new direction that will be followed in the financial services industry and 
that the new principles-based approach is one of the cornerstones of Twin 
Peaks. According to National Treasury, 
the TCF framework is transforming the way in which the supervision of 
market conduct happens. Being implemented by the FSB, TCF is an 
                                            
10  Other objectives include enhancing the efficiency and integrity of the financial 
system (clause 52 (b) of the FSR Bill) and providing financial customers and 
potential financial customers with financial education programmes, promoting 
financial literacy and financial capability (clause 52(c)). 
11  Clause 52 of the FSR Bill. 
12  Clauses 95(b)(ii) and (iii) of the FSR Bill. 
13  Clause 95(e) of the FSR Bill. 
14  Clause 95(i) of the FSR Bill. 
15  Clause 95(j) of the FSR Bill. 
16  Clause 95(m) of the FSR Bill. 
17  See Millard 2014 THRHR 547-566. 
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activities-based, cross-cutting and outcomes-driven approach to regulation 
and supervision, designed to ensure that regulated financial institutions 
apply specific standards of fairness to all financial customers.18  
What is clear is that financial institutions must demonstrate that they 
deliver specified outcomes to their customers. These outcomes are the 
following, namely: 
 customers can be confident they are dealing with firms where TCF is 
central to the corporate culture; 
 products and services marketed and sold in the retail market are 
designed to meet the needs of identified customer groups and are 
targeted accordingly; 
 customers are provided with clear information and are kept 
appropriately informed before, during and after point of sale; 
 where advice is given, it is suitable and takes account of customer 
circumstances; 
 products perform as firms have led customers to expect, and service 
is of an acceptable standard and as they have been led to expect; 
and 
 customers do not face unreasonable post-sale barriers imposed by 
firms to change product, switch providers, submit a claim or make a 
complaint.19  
A closer look at these outcomes reveals that there are existing standards 
that aim to ensure fair outcomes. Outcome three that deals with clear 
information before, during and after point of sale and outcome four that 
deals with the suitability of advice are excellent examples. Section 8 of the 
General Code of Conduct for Authorised Financial Services Providers and 
Representatives (GCC) places an obligation on a provider other than a 
direct marketer to take reasonable steps to seek from the client 
appropriate and available information regarding the client's financial 
situation, financial product experience and objectives so that the provider 
                                            
18  National Treasury 2014 http://www.treasury.gov.za/public%20comments/FSR2014/ 
Treating%20Customers%20Fairly%20in%20the%20Financial%20Sector%20Draft%
20MCP%20Framework%20Amended%20Jan2015%20WithAp6.pdf 50. 
19  National Treasury 2014 http://www.treasury.gov.za/public%20comments/FSR2014/ 
Treating%20Customers%20Fairly%20in%20the%20Financial%20Sector%20Draft%
20MCP%20Framework%20Amended%20Jan2015%20WithAp6.pdf 51. 
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can provide the client with appropriate advice.20 A provider must conduct 
an analysis for purposes of the advice and identify the product that is the 
most appropriate to the client's financial needs.21 What is more, section 
8(2) of the GCC states that a provider must take reasonable steps to 
ensure that the client understands the advice and that the client is in a 
position to make an informed decision. Therefore, it is reasonably safe to 
say that many of the principles that are embodied by the TCF outcomes 
are already part of South African law. It is against this background that 
some of the past year's Ombud determinations, Enforcement Committee 
cases and high court cases will be discussed. 
PART II: OMBUD DETERMINATIONS 
1 Mandate of the FAIS Ombud 
The FAIS Ombud is a statutory ombud that is constituted by virtue of 
section 20 of the FAIS Act.22 The FAIS Ombud derives its authority to 
adjudicate from the FAIS Act and more specifically from the Rules on 
Proceedings of the Office of the Ombud for Financial Services Providers, 
2003 promulgated by virtue of section 26 of the FAIS Act. Because the 
FAIS Act deals with the activities of advisors and intermediaries in respect 
of all financial products as defined, it is not only insurance intermediaries, 
advisors and representatives who may fall under the FAIS Ombud's 
jurisdiction but also those who render any other service in relation to a 
financial product as defined by the FAIS Act. In addition, a client must first 
exhaust the internal complaint resolution system and procedures as set 
out by Part XI of the GCC.23 As it is, fairness is already a consideration in 
internal complaint resolution procedures and where disputes cannot be 
                                            
20  Section 8(1)(a) of the General Code of Conduct for Authorised Financial Services 
Providers and Representatives (GCC). 
21  Sections 8(1)(b) and (c) of the GCC. 
22  This particular section provides as follows: "(1) There is an office to be known as the 
Office of the Ombud for Financial Services Providers. (2) The functions of the Office 
are performed by the Ombud for Financial Services Providers. (3) The objective of 
the Ombud is to consider and dispose of complaints in a procedurally fair, informal, 
economical and expeditious manner and by reference to what is equitable in all the 
circumstances, with due regard to – (a) the contractual arrangement or other legal 
relationship between the complainant and any other party to the complaint; and (b) 
the provisions of this Act. (4) When dealing with complaints in terms of sections 27 
and 28 the Ombud is independent and must be impartial." 
23  Section 17(d) of Part XI of the GCC, titled "Basic principles of systems and 
procedures" stipulates that internal dispute resolution procedures should be based 
on fairness in ensuring that a resolution process should be fair to both clients, the 
provider and its staff. 
D MILLARD  PER / PELJ 2016 (19)  9 
settled and are referred to the FAIS Ombud, the Ombud's mandate is to 
settle disputes. In terms of section 27(5) of the FAIS Act, the Ombud: 
(a) may, in investigating or determining an officially received complaint, 
follow and implement any procedure (including mediation) which the 
Ombud deems appropriate, and may allow any party the right of legal 
representation; 
(b) must, in the first instance, explore any reasonable prospect of 
resolving a complaint by a conciliated settlement acceptable to all 
parties; 
(c)  may, in order to resolve a complaint speedily by conciliation, make a 
recommendation to the parties, requiring them to confirm whether or 
not they accept the recommendation and, where the recommendation 
is not accepted by a party, requiring that party to give reasons for not 
accepting it: Provided that where the parties accept the 
recommendation, such recommendation has the effect of a final 
determination by the Ombud, contemplated in section 28(1); 
(d)  may, in a manner that the Ombud deems appropriate, delineate the 
functions of investigation and determination between various 
functionaries of the Office; and 
(e)  may, on terms specified by the Ombud, mandate any person or 
tribunal to perform any of the functions referred to in paragraph (d). 
If either party rejects a recommendation, the Ombud provides the parties 
with a final determination, but the Ombud may also issue a determination 
without a recommendation.24 In making the determination, the Ombud has 
extensive powers and a determination may include the dismissal of the 
complaint or the upholding of the complaint. Where a complaint is upheld, 
this can be done either wholly or partially, which means that the Ombud 
may award an amount as fair compensation for any "financial prejudice" or 
"damage" suffered. The Ombud may also order the authorised financial 
services provider, representative or other party involved to what the 
Ombud may consider as appropriate.25 Finally, the Ombud may make any 
other order which a Court may make26 and a final determination may also 
include a cost order.27 
2 Fairness 
Rulings by the FAIS Ombud and any division of the High Court constitute 
precedents. Where the FAIS Ombud is required to make a determination 
where the main issue concerns a matter of law, the doctrine of precedent 
is suitable. However, the doctrine is less well suited to cases where the 
FAIS Ombud has to issue a determination that is fair to both the 
respondent (the insurer) and the complainant (the insured), since the 
                                            
24  Moolman et al Financial Advisory and Intermediary Services Guide 223-224. 
25  Moolman et al Financial Advisory and Intermediary Services Guide 223-224. 
26  Moolman et al Financial Advisory and Intermediary Services Guide 223-224. 
27  Moolman et al Financial Advisory and Intermediary Services Guide 223-224. 
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concept of "fairness" depends on the particular circumstances of the 
dispute at hand. What is fair between A and B is not necessarily fair 
between A and C, and in this respect it is submitted that the FAIS 
Ombud's scheme is seriously flawed. It is predicted that this will only 
become worse with the implementation of TCF, as considerations will be 
based more on fairness and less on the law. 
If one considers the origins of TCF and the way in which these principles 
are enforced in the UK, it is evident that although there is a lot of scope for 
infusing the TCF principles in insurance law, these decisions should not be 
used as precedents. General reporting of the Financial Ombudsman 
Service FOS on their determinations has been one of the subjects under 
investigation by Lord Hunt.28 The arguments against detailed reporting are 
that the volumes of cases would be too large to manage,29 that there is a 
danger of seeing these decisions as precedent-setting,30 and that 
publication can "create false and undesirable misapprehensions".31 There 
was a recommendation that leading cases should be reported as case 
studies. However, some felt that Lord Hunt's proposed "FOSBOOK" in 
which cases would be reported would amount to "second-tier regulation".32 
Therefore, the practice of only reporting on findings in general and also 
anonymously is very different from the South African practice of making 
full judgments available to members of the public.33  
3 Jurisdiction of the Ombud 
The matter of reporting brings a second issue to the fore, and that is the 
jurisdiction of the FAIS Ombud. In the recent decision of the Appeal Board 
of the Financial Services Board in Sharemax Investments (Pty) Ltd (in 
Business Rescue) v Siegrist,34 the Appeal Board ruled that the FAIS 
Ombud erred in joining Sharemax and four of its directors in a complaint 
procedure that was brought by two complainants, Siegrist and Bekker, 
against two financial advisors who advised the complainants to invest in 
the Sharemax-promoted Zambesi syndication. The Ombud, on her own 
                                            
28  Lord Hunt 2008 http://bit.ly/1XaPtAa. 
29  Lord Hunt 2008 http://bit.ly/1XaPtAa 50. 
30  Lord Hunt 2008 http://bit.ly/1XaPtAa. 
31  Lord Hunt 2008 http://bit.ly/1XaPtAa. 
32  Blackmore 2008 http://bit.ly/1VLx2me. 
33  Blackmore 2008 http://bit.ly/1VLx2me. 
34  Sharemax Investments (Pty) Ltd (In Business Rescue) v Siegrist case number FAIS 
00039/11-12/GP1 and FAIS 06661/10-11/WC1 of 13 April 2015 (Sharemax 
Investments). 
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initiative, decided to join Sharemax and four of its former and present 
directors as defendants, because she regarded them as "interested 
parties" as described in section 27(4) of the FAIS Act. She subsequently 
denied the directors' leave to appeal against the decision, and when the 
Appeal Board agreed to hear the appeal, the issue of jurisdiction was one 
of the matters that was unpacked. The Appeal Board re-iterated that 
neither section 27(4) nor any other provision in the FAIS Act nor the rules 
that had been promulgated in terms of section 26(1) provides the Ombud 
with the power to join a defendant.35 The Appeal Board states very clearly 
that the complaint before the Ombud is the only issue that should be 
determined. It is not the Ombud's task to police financial services 
providers36 and consequently the appeals were upheld and the orders 
against Siegrist and Bekker set aside. 
4 Fairness and law 
To return to the issue of fairness: although the Ombud must make a 
decision that is fair to all the parties involved, that does not mean that the 
Ombud should have a blatant disregard for South African law. In fact, the 
Appeal Board in Sharemax Investments found it disturbing that the Ombud 
was of the opinion that common-law principles have no place in 
proceedings before her.37 Although the Sharemax Investments case is 
fundamentally about jurisdiction and the Ombud's powers, it is very 
important to note that the Appeal Board also states that where there is a 
matter before the Ombud and it is based on the breach of a statutory duty, 
common-law principles apply. Similarly, where a matter hinges on breach 
of contract or delict, the Ombud should also have regard to common-law 
principles. Unfortunately, the rather short decisions by the Ombud often 
set out the facts and the decision, together with the relevant statutory 
principles, but all too often there is only mention of breach of the GCC and 
no investigation into matters such as breach of contract or negligence. The 
brief exposition below picks up on this issue. 
5 FSR Bill 
Among the many objectives of the FSR Bill there are specific ones that are 
aimed at providing for a more effective council for financial ombud 
services and for the council to oversee the ombud schemes. In addition, 
                                            
35  Sharemax Investments paras 49 and 52. 
36  Sharemax Investments para 16. 
37  Sharemax Investments para 19. 
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the Bill aims to provide for the "recognition of recognised schemes",38 to 
lay down minimum requirements for schemes,39 to promote financial 
customer education with regard to schemes,40 to co-ordinate the activities 
of ombuds of recognised schemes with the activities of the statutory 
ombud schemes, and to develop and promote best practices for complaint 
resolution.41  
It is not clear how the Council who is to oversee the Ombud will make 
much of a difference. From the Sharemax debacle it is evident that the 
Appeal Board is currently equipped to overrule an inaccurate decision by 
the Ombud. In actual fact, the current appeal procedure should be more 
than adequate to ensure fairness in all respects. However, a closer look at 
the FSR Bill reveals a total overhaul of the current system. The Financial 
Services Ombuds Schemes Act42 will be repealed and integrated in the 
FSR Bill in such a way that the Financial Services Ombuds Schemes 
Council (FSOS Council) will have the power to consolidate and streamline 
ombuds arrangements more effectively. All existing ombuds will remain in 
place and will continue to function, but the FSOS Council will promote and 
direct co-operation and co-ordination of the activities of the schemes to 
achieve an overarching and unified complaint-resolution service for 
consumers. Clause 168 of the revised FSR Bill contains the new statutory 
provisions pertaining to the Council.43 The functions of the Council are 
provided for in clause 176 and this provision stipulates inter alia that the 
Council, in consultation with the relevant ombud, should develop and 
promote best practices for complaint resolution by a particular scheme.44 
According to clause 176(2)(a), the Council must ensure that a council 
standard does not impede the independence of an ombud or interfere with 
the investigation or determination of a complaint. 
Another change that will be introduced is that there will be an office of the 
Ombud for Financial Services Providers and the office of the adjudicator.45 
                                            
38  Preamble to the FSR Bill. 
39  Preamble to the FSR Bill. 
40  Preamble to the FSR Bill. 
41  Preamble to the FSR Bill. 
42  Financial Services Ombud Schemes Act 37 of 2004. 
43  Clause 168 of the FSR Bill provides as follows: "(1) The Financial Services Ombud 
Schemes Council that was established in terms of section 2 of the Financial Services 
Ombud Schemes Act, 2004 (Act No. 37 of 2004), continues in existence. (2) The 
Council is an independent body that has the powers and duties, and performs the 
functions, that are set out in this Act. (3) The Council is directly accountable to the 
Minister." 
44  Clause 176(1)(d) of the FSR Bill. 
45  Clause 177 of the FSR Bill. 
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Clause 180 stipulates that the objective of the Adjudicator and the Ombud 
for Financial Services Providers is  
to consider and dispose of complaints in their respective spheres in a 
procedurally fair, informal, economical and expeditious manner and by 
reference to what is equitable in all the circumstances.  
In doing so, they should have regard to the contractual arrangement or 
other legal relationship between the complainant and any other party to 
the complaint and the provisions of the FSR Bill, any other applicable law, 
conduct standard, codes of conduct, pension fund rules and rules of 
practice. These two spheres referred to are financial services as currently 
described by the FAIS Act on the one hand and pensions on the other 
hand. 
Especially in the sense that the Adjudicator and Ombud should have 
regard to fairness, the relationship between the parties and the law, the 
FSR Bill seems to echo what is already contained in the FAIS Act and 
what has been blatantly disregarded by the FAIS Ombud in Sharemax. 
What is innovative though is that the revised FSR Bill imposes a duty on 
the regulators to co-operate with the Financial Intelligence Centre and 
otherwise assist in preventing and combating financial crime. Furthermore, 
clause 77 of the FSR Bill stipulates that the financial sector regulators and 
the Financial Intelligence Centre must enter into an agreement in respect 
to how they will co-ordinate the performance of their functions in terms of 
the Financial Intelligence Centre Act.46 
The problem with determinations as precedents has not been addressed 
by the FSR Bill. Section 186(1)(b)(iv) stipulates that the Ombud may make 
any other order which a court may make.  
6 More of the same? 
6.1 General 
An overview of the activities of the FAIS Ombud for 2014 reveals that a 
variety of complaints were heard. Some of these dealt with important legal 
issues and considerations other than fairness should ideally have informed 
these issues. A summary of some of these cases will be given to illustrate 
this point. 
                                            
46  Financial Intelligence Centre Act 38 of 2001. 
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6.2 Services under supervision and vicarious liability 
In Judith Augusta Theophiel Eduard Campioni-De Vleesshauwer v Suzette 
Brickhill and Mathys Johannes Marais t/a Protea Makelaars47 and Auberge 
Guest Lodge CC v Suzette Brickhill and Mathys Johannes Marais t/a 
Protea Makelaars48 the Ombud ruled that Brickhill breached section 2 of 
the GCC because she failed to act with due skill, care and diligence and in 
the interests of clients and the integrity of the financial services industry. 
Brickhill rendered services under supervision and she had been in the 
employment of Marais (Protea Makelaars) since 1 May 2001. Despite 
Marais visiting Brickhill every six to eight weeks and performing an annual 
audit, Brickhill managed to defraud the two complainants in question. 
Brickhill persuaded new clients to pay annual premiums on their policies. 
She provided them with false invoices on Protea's letterhead. Brickhill did 
not keep these files in her office and Marais was ignorant of her activities. 
When he discovered her deceit, he immediately dismissed her. The 
Ombud had to decide two issues, namely whether there was sufficient 
evidence to find that Brickhill breached her duties in terms of the GCC by 
acting dishonestly and whether this caused the complainants in both 
cases to suffer financial loss. The second question was whether both 
Brickhill and Marais should be held liable.  
The Ombud found that both complainants transferred their "annual 
premiums" to Brickhill. Neither Brickhill nor Marais had a mandate to 
collect premiums on behalf of Santam. Furthermore, the Ombud found on 
the facts that Marais allowed Brickhill to render financial services to the 
public whilst not being registered with the Registrar as his representative 
in terms of section 13 of the FAIS Act. Brickhill's rendering of services to 
the public was therefore not only a matter of her violating the law but also 
a transgression by Marais. Brickhill was not allowed to render services 
without supervision and that constituted a failure on Marais' behalf. As part 
of his ongoing obligation to supervise Brickhill, Marais should also have 
ensured that she complied with the GCC as required in terms of section 
13(2)(b) of the FAIS Act. According to the Ombud, his failure to utilise 
resources, procedures and technological systems efficiently to prevent 
harm to clients rendered him liable. In both cases, the Ombud found that 
Brickhill rendered her services to the public for and on behalf of Marais 
                                            
47  Judith Augusta Theophiel Eduard Campioni-De Vleesshauwer v Suzette Brickhill 
and Mathys Johannes Marais t/a Protea Makelaars case number FAIS 04437/11-
12/lp 3. 
48  Auberge Guest Lodge CC v Suzette Brickhill and Mathys Johannes Marais t/a 
Protea Makelaars case number FAIS 05228/11-12/MP 3. 
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and it was in the course and scope of her employment that Brickhill 
misappropriated insurance premiums. For these reasons the Ombud 
determined that Brickhill and Marais were jointly and severally liable to the 
complainants.  
In this particular instance the Ombud's decision cannot be faulted, as the 
supervision of services plays an important role in the insurance industry. 
Those representatives who do not meet certain of the competency 
requirements must render services under the guidance, instruction and 
supervision of a supervisor.49 The rights and duties of the supervisor are 
accordingly specified. As far as the law is concerned, this particular case 
is an example of where a court would have determined the issue not only 
on the stipulations of the FAIS Act but also on the employer-employee-
relationship that gives rise to vicarious liability. Matters such as the 
relationship between the parties (being one of employer and employee), 
the fact that Brickhill had possibly committed a delict, and the question 
whether she had acted in the scope of her employment are matters that 
would have been debated. Therefore, although the outcome of the two 
decisions in question was satisfactory, a proper exposition of Marais' direct 
and possibly vicarous liability would have been instructive. This proves the 
point that although decisions such as these are fair, they should not be 
usd as precedents. Unfortunately the FSR Bill does not change this.  
6.3 Incidentalia of insurance contracts and the duties of advisors 
The proverbial devil is in the detail, and because insurance is complex, 
prospective policyholders should ensure that they read an offer and 
acquaint themselves with the details before they enter into an insurance 
contract. Because of the asymmetry of information, there is a duty on 
intermediaries to explain the terms of the policy clients are about to 
procure. Onerous clauses are particularly problematic. In Fliptrans CC v S 
& P Insurance Advisors (Pty) Ltd t/a McCrystal and Partners and E 
Solmes,50 the dispute between the complainant and the respondents 
stemmed from the repudiation of a claim in terms of a short-term policy 
with New National. The policy was for the insurance of the complainant's 
motorcycle. The motorcycle was stolen on 9 July 2013 and the theft was 
reported to the respondents, S & P Insurance Advisors (Pty) Ltd t/a 
McCrystal and Partners and Elton Solms, the director of the first 
respondent. Essentially, the complainant's complaint is that the 
                                            
49  BN 104 of 2008 in GG 31514 of 15 October 2008. 
50  Fliptrans CC v S & P Insurance Advisors (Pty) Ltd t/a McCrystal and Partners and E 
Solmes case number FAIS 07987/11-12/GP3. 
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respondents as intermediaries failed to inform the complainant that the 
motorcycle had to be fitted with a tracking device. As a result, the 
complainant failed to fit such a device and this failure was the reason for 
New National's repudiation of the claim. In other words, had the 
complainant's attention been drawn to this particular requirement in the 
policy, he would have fitted the device and the claim would have 
succeeded. Accordingly, he would not have lost R79 500, which was the 
value of the motor cycle at the time of the loss. 
The question in casu is essentially whether the respondent had failed in 
his duties as set out by section 7(1)(c)(vii) of the GCC. This subsection 
stipulates that a provider other than a direct marketer must provide, at the 
earliest possible opportunity, "concise details of any special terms or 
conditions, exclusions of liability, waiting periods, loadings, penalties, 
excesses, restrictions or circumstances in which benefits will not be 
provided". Insurance contracts are mosty standardised. Those who 
provide advice and intermediary services or at least earn commission for 
selling insurance have a duty to perform in terms of their mandate. In this 
particular case, the facts revealed that the insurance that was sold to the 
respondent was in fact incidental to the sale of his motor cycle and the 
respondent was in actual fact not involved in the transaction. He definitely 
did not provide advice and did not explain those onerous clauses in the 
contract.  
This particular determination is no doubt fair. It follows other 
determinations such as Susanna Aletta Grobler v Direct Axis (Pty) Ltd51 
and re-iterates the fact that intermediaries must sing for their supper. 
However, if one considers contract law and what constitutes consensus 
between the parties, several legal issues come to the fore. While the 
determination satisfies one's sense of fairness, there are several issues 
pertaining to consensus, pro-forma type contracts and vagueness of 
contractual terms that could have been better explained. Again, a 
determination such as the one in Fliptrans should not have been a 
precedent but could at the most have been presented as an example of 
what is expected of an insurance broker when selling a motor policy. 
The exact same clause of the GCC was the subject of discussion in 
Andrew Graham Stunden and Nicolaas Leon van der Walt t/a Investment 
& Insurance Brokers.52 In casu the complainant was the owner of a house 
                                            
51  Susanna Aletta Grobler v Direct Axis (Pty) Ltd case number FOC 1434/05 NP 2. 
52  Andrew Graham Stunden and Nicolaas Leon van der Walt t/a Investment & 
Insurance Brokers case number FAIS 01993/11-12/WC 3 
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in Knysna. The respondent was an insurance broker and a sole proprietor 
trading as Investment and Insurance Brokers. The respondent personally 
rendered financial services to the complainant and on the former's advice 
he placed his motor and household contents cover with Santam in 1999. 
When the complainant moved into a new house in June 2004, he again 
consulted with the respondent. He informed the respondent that his home 
had burglar bars on the ground floor windows only and that a linked alarm 
would be installed the following week. The respondent noted this and then 
proceeded to note the installation of the alarm the following week. The 
respondent and complainant met anually to adjust the insured values and 
other changes to the policy.  
In July 2009 the insurer issued a notice to all brokers informing them that 
with effect from 1 September 2009 the security measures in the Knysna 
area would be burglar bars and security gates as well as a linked alarm. 
This notice further stated that Santam had experienced a high claims rate 
and urged brokers to infom their clients that alarms needed to be fitted. 
The complainant suffered a burglary at his home on 5 June 2010, and at 
the time only the ground floor windows were potected by burglar bars. The 
house was also protected by an alarm linked to an armed response. 
Santam established that the burglars gained access to the house through 
a top-floor window by using a long ladder. The window had not been 
protected by burglar bars. The alarm had been triggered when the 
burglary took place but the buglars escaped. The complainant's claim to 
Santam was rejected because he had not complied with the minimum 
security requirement of burglar bars on all windows. The essential 
question was whether the Respondent's conduct amounted to a 
contravention of the FAIS Act and the GCC and if so, whether this caused 
the complainant to suffer financial prejudice. The Ombud determined that 
there had in fact been a contravention of the GCC as the respondent had 
known about the insurer's new requirements but had in fact failed to 
convey the information to the complainant. What makes this determination 
different from the one in Fliptrans is that this case dealt with an existing 
contract for short-term insurance that had been in place for some time. 
The insurance company changed its requirements pertaining to burglar 
bars and the broker did not convey the information to the complainant. 
Situations such as these are perhaps not that easily explained in contract 
law. However, as this additional requirement by the insurer constitues a 
material change to the contract, it is submitted that it was absolutely 
essential for the broker to ensure that policyholders were informed of this 
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change. This would have afforded them an opportunity to make an 
informed decision as to their contunued relationship withj the insurer.  
Again, although the Ombud's decision satisfies one's sense of fairness, 
there are questions on contract law and the variation of contractual terms 
that are not addressed by this determination. On the facts it is evident that 
the respondent did not perform his duties as could be expected. It is 
submitted that a rules-based approach as is proposed by the FSR bill will 
have an influence on market conduct and that issues such as the non-
disclosure of onerous terms will be more important. Matters such as plain 
language, consumer education and the format in which policies are 
presented to clients are expected to become more important, and TCF 
outcomes will influence traditional contract theory as we know it. 
7 Conducting business without a licence 
A recurring problem in the insurance industry seems to be the conducting 
of business without a licence. A person may not act or offer to act as a 
financial services provider unless such a person has been issued with a 
licence in terms of section 8 of the FAIS Act.53 Key to the granting of a 
licence is the question whether the applicant complies with the 
requirements of fit and proper in accordance with the category of FSP. 
The Registrar must consider issues such as operational ability, financial 
soundness, and whether the key individual meets the characteristics of 
honesty and integrity.  
In The Reformed Christians for Truth Church v Merit Legal and Funeral 
Cost Assistance (Pty) Ltd and Moeti Michael Matlaupane54 the 
complainant, represented by Pastor Paul Teko Mosadi, entered into an 
agreement in terms of which the respondent had to provide certain funeral 
benefits to members of the congregation against the payment of a monthly 
premium. At the outset of the respondents' dealings with the complainant, 
the respondents informed the complainants that the first respondent was 
underwritten by the South African Insurance Company (SAFRICAN) and 
that the first respondent was duly licenced by the Financial Services Board 
(FSB) in terms of the FAIS Act to render financial services to the public. 
The first respondent cited their registration number as 15123. In fact, this 
registration number belonged to SAFRICAN and the first respondent was 
                                            
53  Moolman et al Financial Advisory and Intermediary Services Guide 17. 
54  The Reformed Christians for Truth Church v Merit Legal and Funeral Cost 
Assistance (Pty) Ltd and Moeti Michael Matlaupane case number FAIS 08606/12-
13/NW 2. 
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not ever licenced to conduct insurance business. The parties agreed that 
the claimant would be paid within a period of 48 hours after the lodgement 
of a claim. The complainant paid the respondent the agreed monthly 
premiums. During December 2012 one of the complainant's congregants 
passed away. When no paymant was forthcoming, the complainant's 
investigation revealed that there had never been any insurance cover. 
The Ombud's investigations confirmed that neither the first nor the second 
respondent were registered with the Financial Services Board and there 
was no evidence that the second respondent had ever been registered as 
an agent of a financial services provider. The respondent made the 
statements knowing well that he was acting illegally and that he had no 
intention of ever paying on any insurance claim. Therefore, the second 
respondent's conduct was both illegal in terms of the FAIS Act and 
unlawful in terms of common law. It seems that despite the strict regulatory 
environment, dishonest charlatans still manage to con members of the 
public. 
In the same vein but pertaining to short-term insurance, some 22 
determinations were made against Pieter De Wet t/a Model Insurance 
Company, the first of which was made in favour of Melvin Shane 
Creswell.55 Mr Creswell was one of a number of policy holders who 
approached the Ombud's office because the respondent failed to honour 
their claims. It appears that the respondent, Pieter de Wet t/a Model 
Insurance Company, presented himself to members of the public as as an 
authorised short-term insurer and he collected premiums from non-
suspecting consumers such as the complainant. The Registrar of Short-
term Insurance (Registrar) confirmed that the respondent had never been 
licensed in terms of section 7(1) of the FAIS Act to render financial 
services to the public. He had also never been licensed to conduct 
business as a short-term insurer as stipulated by section 7 of the STIA. 
This particular section stipulates as follows: 
(1)  No person shall carry on any kind of short-term insurance business 
unless that person— 
(a)  is registered or deemed to be registered as a short-term insurer, and 
is authorised to carry on the kind of short-term insurance business 
concerned under this Act; or  
(b)  is authorised under section 56 to do so, and carries on that business 
in accordance with this Act. 
                                            
55  Melvin Shane Creswell v Pieter De Wet t/a Model Insurance Company Case number 
FSOS 00184/11-12/KZN(3). 
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During February 2012 the Registrar warned the public not to do business 
with Model, and this particular saga is an example of where there is 
already a measure of information-sharing between the Registrar and the 
FAIS Ombud and of how the current FSB and the FAIS Ombud do have 
the opportunity to co-operate in a way that is not to the detriment of 
complainants or respondents but can in fact prevent members of the 
public from suffering financial prejudice. The respondent ignored this 
warning and continued to do insurance business without a licence. The 
Registrar then reported the respondent to the Commercial Crime Branch 
of the South African Police Service. In addition, the Registrar obtained an 
interim interdict in the Kwazulu-Natal High Court to stop the respondent 
from carrying out short-term insurance business. 
The outcomes of all these cases were basically the same, namely that it 
was evident that the respondent carried on regardless of the Registrar's 
warnings. This caused financial prejudice to all the complainants involved.  
Of course, in all the cases where members of the public were conned by 
unlicensed financial services providers, these complainants benefited from 
approaching the FAIS Ombud because their complaints could be dealt with 
expeditiously. Had court procedures been their only hope of claiming their 
losses, these procedures would have been costly and would in all 
likelihood have been delayed because the court rolls are so full. The 
Ombud serves a clear purpose here. Furthermore, the Ombud is in an 
ideal position to notify the Registrar as soon as it becomes evident that 
someone such as Pieter de Wet is providing financial services illegally. 
This is perhaps one of the greatest advantages of having a dedicated, 
alternative dispute resolution system such as the FAIS Ombud.  
8 Conclusion 
It is thought that the enhanced oversight of ombud schemes envisaged by 
the FSR Bill has the potential to adddress some of the challenges in 
insurance market conduct. These include stronger empowerment of the 
FSOS Council to consolidate and streamline Ombud determinations more 
effectively.56 Fairness has from the outset been one of the criteria for 
decisions by the FAIS Ombud, and even though the Ombud's 
determinations do not always deal with points of law in a very satisfactory 
way, many determinations do enforce the right of consumers of insurance 
products. Other than the streamlining of Ombud determinations and 
                                            
56  National Treasury 2014 http://bit.ly/21B0sTU 14. 
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oversight by the new FSOS Council, it seems that nothing much will 
change on this front with the introduction of the FSR Bill. Ombud 
determinations will still have the effect of court judgments and these will 
still be reported as precedents. 
PART III: PRUDENTIAL AUTHORITY 
1 Background 
Generally speaking, prudential regulation and supervision aim to promote 
financial system stability and issues such as the solvency and liquidity of 
financial institutions are the focus of this function.57 
One of the many functions of the prudential authority will be to undertake 
administrative and enforcement action as per chapters 12 and 13 of the 
FSR Bill, and "administrative action" has the meaning defined in section 1 
of the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act.58 Chapter 13 of the FSR Bill 
sets out the powers of financial authorities to institute administrative action 
and according to clause 147(a) of the Bill. 
The Promotion of Administrative Justice Act applies to any administrative 
action taken by a financial sector regulator in terms of this Act or a 
financial sector law subject to paragraph (c), which specifies that there 
may be different procedures for any specific administrative action provided 
that those procedures are fair, reasonable and justifiable in the 
circumstances.  
There are further obligations on financial sector regulators to 
put in place and maintain effective arrangements for taking administrative 
actions that are consistent with the FSR Bill, the Promotion of Administrative 
Justice Act, and the requirements of the other financial sector laws, which 
arrangements must include the adoption of administrative action procedures, 
and may include the establishment of an administrative action committee 
and other measures.59  
                                            
57  National Treasury 2014 http://bit.ly/21B0sTU 10. 
58  Promotion of Administrative Justice Act 3 of 2000. This statute defines 
"administrative action" as meaning any decision taken, or any failure to take a 
decision, by "(a) an organ of state, when – (i) exercising a power in terms of the 
Constitution or a provincial constitution; or (ii) exercising a public power or 
performing a public function in terms of any legislation; or (b) a natural or juristic 
person, other than an organ of state, when exercising a public power or performing a 
public function in terms of an empowering provision, which adversely affects the 
rights of any person and which has a direct, external legal effect". 
59  Clause 147(b) of the FSR Bill. 
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It is foreseen that enforcement actions will mainly deal with the issuing of 
directives, entering into enforceable undertakings, declaring practices as 
undesirable, applying to court for appropriate orders, and imposing 
administrative penalties. Where the focus in the past has perhaps been 
more on penalties, that has now shifted and the FSR Bill states that 
remediation aims to rectify the breach and ensure it does not recur. In 
addition, and according to the principles of the promotion of administrative 
justice, chapter 15 sets out a strong appeal mechanism. Therefore, if the 
prudential authority detects a breach of a financial sector law, including of 
a prudential or conduct standard, it can choose to take remedial or 
punitive action. The FSR Bill provides the power to issue directives, 
enforceable undertakings, interdicts and debarment orders, and to impose 
administrative penalties.  
These powers are not new to the regulatory authorities, and for the most 
part are a familiar feature of financial sector laws, but it is expected that 
administrative functions will be harmonised by the new legislative 
dispensation. Currently the FAIS Act contains detailed sections on 
offences and the payment of penalties which may be imposed by the 
Registar of the FSB. Any financial services provider that does not comply 
with its statutory duties may be penalised, and this function of the FSB is 
exercised by the Enforcement Committee. This Committee, which is an 
administrative body established in terms of the Financial Services Board 
Act 97 of 1990, is empowered to impose unlimited penalties, 
compensation orders and cost orders, and its determinations are 
enforceable as if they were a judgment of a court of law. The policing of 
the industry remains an important function and the FSR Bill provides inter 
alia for enforcement powers, the establishment of the Financial Services 
Tribunal, procedures for taking decisions and the appeal of these 
decisions. 
According to National Treasury clear, transparent, fair enforcement 
mechanisms are a crucial part of an effective financial regulatory system. 
A Financial Services Tribunal is established to support fair administrative 
action and enforcement by the authorities. It is, however, not only the 
structure that will be reformed, but also the nature of regulation, 
supervision and enforcement. Therefore the new authorities "will be more 
proactive and intrusive in their supervision, and more principles-based in 
taking action where necessary".60  
                                            
60  National Treasury 2014 http://bit.ly/21B0sTU 39. 
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As far as administrative actions are concerned, the actions described 
below show that the Enforcement Committee usually acts where there is a 
breach of a particular rule. The FSR Bill, however, envisages for the new 
authority to "act decisively where necessary, at times on the basis of 
judgement rather than a formal 'breach' of a specific rule".61  
Therefore, the new definition of the difference between remedial and 
penalty actions perhaps signals the taking of a more innovative approach 
than the current approach, and directives and enforceable undertakings 
now also form part of the proposed new legislation. Where directives have 
been issued before, enforceable undertakings (EUs) are a new instrument 
for most sectors, although they have been introduced in the Financial 
Services Board Act recently. Clause 142 of the FSR Bill stipulates that a 
financial sector regulator may accept a written enforceable undertaking by 
a person in relation to any conduct engaged in by the person in respect of 
which the financial sector regulator has a function in terms of a financial 
sector law. The person may, with the regulator's consent, withdraw or vary 
the undertaking at any time.62 The crux of the concept legislation is found 
in clause 142(3), which stipulates as follows: 
(3) If the financial sector regulator considers that the person who gave the 
undertaking has breached a term of the undertaking, the Financial 
Sector Regulator may:  
(a)  impose an administrative penalty;  
(b)  apply to a Court for an order directing that person to comply with the 
terms of the undertaking, or any other order the Court considers 
appropriate; or  
(c)  in the case of a licensed financial institution, suspend or withdraw the 
licence of the financial institution. 
Furthermore, clause 142(4) holds that an enforceable undertaking must be 
made public by the financial sector regulator in a manner that the financial 
sector regulator determines is appropriate. The purpose of the new rules 
pertaining to an enforceable undertaking is that it provides the regulator 
with broad corrective powers under an agreement with the wrongdoer. It is 
expected that enforceable undertakings will set out detailed steps for 
correcting a deeply flawed aspect of a financial institution's process or 
system.  
Court orders by the High Court to compel a financial institution to comply 
with a financial sector law, to compel compliance with a rule, directive or 
lawful request, remain part of the new prudential authority's armour. 
                                            
61  National Treasury 2014 http://bit.ly/21B0sTU 39. 
62  Clause 142(2) of the FSR Bill. 
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What is different under the new Twin Peaks legislation is the new 
Financial Services Tribunal. The Tribunal's powers is set out in chapter 15 
of the FSR Bill and clause 145 stipulates that the function of the Tribunal is 
to hear and decide appeals by persons aggrieved by a decision of a 
decision-maker in terms of a financial sector law. The Tribunal may also 
order a party to the appeal to pay some or all of the costs incurred by the 
other party. An order by the Tribunal has legal force, and may be enforced 
as if it were issued in civil proceedings in a division of the High Court.63 
2 Recent enforcement actions 
Over the past year, enforcement actions pertaining to insurance products 
were mostly satisfactory. Determinations included The Registrar of 
Financial Services Providers v Finstate CC.64 In casu the Registrar's 
action against Finstate was based on two contraventions. The first was a 
contravention of section 13(2)(a) of the FAIS Act and the second a 
contravention of section 12(c) of the GCC. The parties agreed that both 
these provisions had been contravened and the agreed penalty was R40 
000. More specifically, in this particular enforcement action some of 
Finstate's representatives rendered financial services during October 2011 
and October 2012 in respect of health services benefits from Discovery. 
These representatives were not competent to render these services 
because they were not duly accredited in terms of regulation 28 B of the 
Medical Schemes Act 131 of 1998. 
Section 13(2)(a) of the FAIS Act reads as follows: 
An authorised financial services provider must at all times be satisfied that 
the provider's representatives, and the key individuals of such 
representatives, are, when rendering a financial service on behalf of the 
provider, competent to act, and comply with the requirements contemplated 
in paragraphs (a) and (b) of section 8(1) and subsection 1(b)(ii) of this 
section, where applicable. 
The reference to section 8(1) is to the fit and proper requirements, which 
entail that financial services providers must comply with the characteristics 
of honesty and integrity, competence, operational ability and financial 
soundness. The second charge pertaining to the contravention of section 
12(c) of the GCC entails Finstate's failure to structure its internal control 
procdures "so as to provide reasonable assurance that all applicable laws 
                                            
63  National Treasury 2014 http://bit.ly/21B0sTU 42. 
64  The Registrar of Financial Services Providers v Finstate CC case number 12/2013. 
For a discussion of the case, see Millard 2014 JILB 1. 
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were complied with".65 Failure to do so resulted in a contravention of 
section 13(2)(a) of the FAIS Act.66 
In The Registrar of Short-term Insurance v The Lawyers Voice (Pty) Ltd67 
there was a contravention of section 7(1)(a) of the STIA. This particular 
section provides that  
no person shall carry on any kind of short-term insurance business, unless 
that person is registered or deemed to be registered as a short-term insurer, 
and is authorised to carry on the kind of short-term insurance business 
concerned, under this Act. 
Where some contraventions are not so serious and do not cause harm to 
consumers of financial products, others have more serious implications. In 
The Registrar of Short-term Insurance v Santam Ltd68 Santam authorised 
a small number of collecting agencies to collect premiums for short-term 
policies (personal lines) on its behalf between November 2008 and March 
2013. In doing so Santam contravened several legislative provisions, 
including Directive 156.A.i (ST) read with section 4(2) of the STIA, section 
45 of the STIA and regulations 4.1(1) and 4.1(2) of the Regulations in 
terms of the STIA. In addition, Santam failed to use the prescribed method 
in the STIA to calculate its unearned premium provision for its crop 
insurance class. (This particular contravention is of an actuarial nature and 
will not be discussed here.) The parties agreed that Santam would pay a 
fine of R200 000.69 
The essence of the contravention is found in section 45 of the STIA, which 
states as follows: 
No independent intermediary shall receive, hold or in any other manner deal 
with premiums payable under a short-term policy entered into or to be entered 
into with a short-term insurer, other than a short-term reinsurance policy, and 
no such short-term insurer shall permit such independent intermediary to so 
receive, hold or in any other manner deal with such premiums— 
(a) unless authorised to do so by the short-term insurer concerned as 
prescribed by regulation; and 
(b) otherwise than in accordance with the regulations. 
                                            
65  Millard 2014 JILB 1-2. 
66  Millard 2014 JILB 1-2. 
67  The Registrar of Short-term Insurance v The Lawyers Voice (Pty) Ltd case number 
09/2013. 
68  The Registrar of Short-term Insurance v Santam Ltd case number 11/2013. 
69  Millard 2014 JILB 3-4. 
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Regulation 4.1(1) stipulates that a short-term insurer should authorise a 
collecting agency in writing to receive, hold or deal with premiums on its 
behalf, and regulation 4.1(2) requires an insurer to obtain securities from 
the collecting agencies. Not only did Santaim fail to provide written 
authorisation to these collecting agencies and to obtain securities, but it 
also failed to furnish the Registrar with proof of the written authorisation 
and securities in accordance with section 4(2) of the Short-term Insurance 
Act. This particular section, read with Directive 156.A.i (ST), instructs 
short-term insurers to provide the Registrar with an action plan to rectify 
the non-compliance with section 45 within 15 days from the date of 
informing the Registrar.70 
This particular transgression highlights the important role of the Registrar 
in protecting the interests of policyholders and it illustrates the need for 
proper compliance measures. Because the collection of premiums is a 
core function of insurance business, it cannot be entrusted to just anybody 
and if a third party is entrusted with the collection of premiums, it is 
essential that that agreement complies with the stipulations of the STIA. 
This is an example of where the Enforcement Committee acted to penalise 
breach of a particular statutory provision.  
In The Registrar of Financial Services Providers v Hippo Comparative 
Services (Pty) Ltd,71 the respondent, through its call centre, provided 
financial services to members of the public betweeen 19 April 2011 and 7 
September 2012. These services included the selling of short-term 
insurance policies on behalf of various short-term insurers. As part of 
these services the call center agents were also required to provide clients 
with different insurance quotations before selling a particular product. 
Unfortunately the call centre failed to provide clients with the complete lists 
of generated quotations and in some cases only provided clients with the 
cheapest quotations. This particular modus operandi resulted in "an 
approach in terms of which, in some cases, preference was given to the 
quantity of business over the quality of service rendered to clients".72 The 
parties agreed that the respondent's behaviour constituted a contravention 
of section 3A(1)(b)(i) of the GCC.73 In addition to the contravention of 
                                            
70  Millard 2014 JILB 3-4. 
71  The Registrar of Financial Services Providers v Hippo Comparative Services (Pty) 
Ltd case number 08/2013 (Hippo Comparative Services). 
72  See Millard 2014 JILB 6-7. 
73  Section 3A "Financial interest and conflict of interest management policy" of the 
GCC came into effect on 19 April 2011. S 3A(1)(b)(i) holds that a provider may not 
offer any financial interest to a representative of that provider for giving preference to 
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section 3A(1)(b)(i), it was also found that there was a contravention of 
section 15(1) of the GCC. This particular section stipulates as follows: 
A direct marketer must, when rendering a financial service to or on behalf of 
a client, at the earliest reasonable opportunity furnish the client with the 
following particulars: 
(a) the business or trade name of the direct marketer; 
(b) confirmation whether the direct marketer is a licensed financial service 
provider and details of the financial services which the direct marketer 
is authorised to provide in terms of the license and any conditions or 
restrictions applicable thereto; 
(c) telephone contact details of direct marketer (unless the contact was 
initiated by the client); 
(d) telephone contact details of the compliance department of the direct 
marketer; 
(e) whether the direct marketer holds professional and indemnity 
insurance. 
The respondent failed to inform clients that it was a financial services 
provider. In addition, clients were also not informed of the details of the 
financial services that the respondent was authorised to provide and 
whether it held professional indemnity insurance. Its legal status and 
relationship with the various short-term insurance providers were also not 
disclosed. A penalty of R1 500 000 was imposed.74 
3 Evaluation 
It is suggested that overall the Enforcement Committee's activities are 
already aimed at deterring financial services providers by imposing 
administrative penalties. Just administrative action is evident from the 
composition and activities of the Enforcement Committee and harsh 
penalties serve to protect the interests of consumers of financial services. 
Overall, the changes envisaged by the FSR bill are not expected to have 
much of an impact on insurance companies. Enforcement Action has been 
successful without too much bureaucratic red tape. More intergration and 
information sharing are matters that will be addressed by the Twin Peaks 
Bill.  
                                                                                                                       
the quantity of business secured for the provider to the exclusion of the quality of the 
service rendered to clients. 
74  Hippo Comparative Services para 5. 
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PART IV: COMMON LAW, INSURANCE LEGISLATION AND 
THE PRODUCT LIFE CYCLE 
As was stated above, the current dispensation for insurance allows for 
common-law principles as well as legislation, and products are grouped 
together as either short-term insurance or long-term insurance. Reinecke 
et al refer to this division as "curious and anachronistic".75 Matters were 
definitely complicated by the introduction of a special dispensation for 
insurance (and other) intermediaries and advisors by the FAIS Act and, as 
was argued above, the way in which the Ombud applies principles 
pertaining to fairness have definitely had implications for the way in which 
ordinary contractual principles are applied. The new dispensation is 
expected to muddle matters even further. Once TCF principles have 
become part of the new regulatory framework, courts will have to take this 
into account in deciding matters. This means that it will no longer be 
sufficient to apply the law, but courts will also have to measur the conduct 
of contracting parties against the TCF outcomes and in the light of the 
product-life cycle. It is suggested that it will no longer be possible to only 
consider the policy document as the record that sets out the rights and 
duties of the parties but that issues such as the way in which the product 
was advertised and sold will now also have to be considered. 
Not only the TCF principles but also matters such as the disclosure of 
product information, claims handling, product standards and complaints 
that resort under market conduct will no doubt be more consumer-
oriented. It is an open question how courts will interpret TCF principles in 
disputes on insurance. It is not certain when the FSR Bill will become law. 
However, it is suggested that in the absence of new insurance legislation 
there will be interpretational issues that will make for some interesting 
reading. 
The role of the courts in adjudicating insurance matters remains the same 
in the sense that any aggrieved party may approach a civil court with a 
dispute. An overview of the past year's cases reveals that recurring 
issues remain misrepresentation and the duty to disclose (Visser v 1 Life 
Direct Insurance Limited,76 Valoyi v Absa iDirect Limited77 and Regent 
Insurance Co Ltd v King's Property Development (Pty) Ltd t/a King's 
                                            
75  Reinecke, Van Niekerk and Nienaber South African Insurance Law 10. 
76  Visser v 1 Life Direct Insurance Limited (1005/13) 2014 ZASCA 193 (28 November 
2014). 
77  Valoyi v Absa Idirect Limited (27970/2011) 2014 ZAGPPHC 383 (12 June 2014). 
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Prop).78 In addition, a number of cases addressed issues on the 
incidentalia or what are sometimes perceived as unfair, hidden clauses in 
insurance contracts, which cause costly litigation. There are many 
examples of incidentalia in insurance contracts, such as forfeiture clauses 
in the instance of fraud (see P K Harikasun v New National Assurance 
Company Ltd).79 The effect of a condition precedent was the topic under 
discussion in Screening and Earthworks (Proprietary) Limited v Hollard 
Insurance Company Limited.80 
However, it is suggested that the way in which the courts will apply the 
law as well as the fairness principles is an open question. Insurance 
remains complex and can be simplified only to a certain extent. Although 
the FAIS Ombud will be in a position to adjudicate on matters pertaining 
to insurance that concern the conduct of intermediaries and advisors, 
disputes between policyholders and insurance companies on matters 
such as those that have been mentioned in the previous paragraph still 
involve civil courts. It is not at all certain whether the principles that 
underlie current insurance law can always be related to an existing legal 
principle (statutory or otherwise).81 
The remaining question that needs to be asked is whether the principles 
that underlie current insurance law can be related to an existing legal 
principle (statutory or otherwise).82 In order to answer this question, one 
should start by viewing the product life-cycle of a financial product. TCF 
holds that the real question whether a client has been treated fairly should 
always be answered by viewing the steps in the life-cycle, and these are 
as follows: product service and design, promotion and marketing, advice, 
point of sale, information after point of sale, and complaints handling.83  
As far as product service and design are concerned, a clear legal 
framework as set out by the product-specific legislation (ie the LTIA and 
the STIA) is key. Currently these two statutes set out the definitions of 
products and prescribe the rules that are applicable. For instance, 
"assistance policy" means a life policy in respect of which the aggregate of 
                                            
78  Regent Insurance Co Ltd v King’s Property Development (Pty) Ltd t/a King’s Prop 
2015 3 SA 85 (SCA). 
79  P K Harikasun v New National Assurance Company Ltd (KZN) case number 
190/2008 of 12 December 2013. 
80  Screening and Earthworks (Proprietary) Limited v Hollard Insurance Company 
Limited (2008/27712) 2014 ZAGPJHC 76 (4 April 2014). 
81  On the impact of TCF on insurance contracts, see Millard 2014 THRHR 547-566. 
82  On the impact of TCF on insurance contracts, see Millard 2014 THRHR 547-566. 
83   In general, see Feasibility (Pty) Ltd 2010 http://bit.ly/1XaOyjd; and FSB 2011 
http://bit.ly/1WLwQCm. 
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the value of the policy benefits, other than an annuity, are to be provided 
(not taking into account any bonuses to be determined in the discretion of 
the long-term insurer) and the amount of the premium in return for which 
an annuity is to be provided does not exceed R18 000 or another 
maximum amount prescribed by the minister; and includes a re-assurance 
policy in respect of such a policy.84 According to Reinecke, Van Niekerk 
and Nienaber, an assistance policy may be described as a mini life 
policy.85 They argue that the prudential regulation applicable to insurers 
registered for assistance business is less onerous than for other business 
because those insurers are not permitted to issue policies with higher 
sums insured than those prescribed by statute.86 Setting a maximum on 
the amount payable in terms of a funeral policy is an example of how 
product service and design are already regulated by statute. It is expected 
that in future there will be even stricter product standards. One can 
therefore safely say that if an insurer issues a policy that is not defined in 
the enabling legislation, there is prima facie evidence of unfair treatment. 
Promotion and marketing as the next stage in the product life-cycle may 
lead to difficulties. Currently, the GCC in terms of the FAIS Act contains 
standards on the advertising of insurance products. Despite this, it may 
still happen that there is something wrong with the advertisement and that 
this prompts a client to contact the insurer. The client may find that the 
product offered is not what the advertisement had promised. Although 
there is still such a thing as offer and acceptance and an insurer is free not 
to enter into a contract with the insurer, it often happens that where a 
contract is concluded, a client was promised one thing but then receives 
something entirely different. This in all likelihood amounts to unfair 
treatment. Again, the current legal framework already addresses this TCF 
outcome. The GCC defines "advertisement" as  
any written, printed, electronic or oral communication (including a 
communication by means of a public radio service), which is directed to the 
general public, or any section thereof, or to any client on request, by any 
such person, which is intended merely to call attention to the marketing or 
promotion of financial services offered by such person, and which does not 
purport to provide detailed information regarding any such financial 
services.87 
                                            
84  Section 1 of the LTIA, "assistance policy". 
85  Reinecke, Van Niekerk and Nienaber South African Insurance Law 556. 
86  Reinecke, Van Niekerk and Nienaber South African Insurance Law 556. 
87  Section 1 of the GCC, "advertising". 
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In addition, section 14(1) of the GCC contains detailed rules on 
advertising: 
14(1) An advertisement by any provider must- 
(a) not contain any statement, promise or forecast which is fraudulent, 
untrue or misleading; 
(b) if it contains- 
(i) performance data (including awards and rankings), include references 
to their source and date;  
(ii) illustrations, forecasts or hypothetical data 
(aa)  contain support in the form of clearly stated basic assumptions 
(including but not limited to any relevant assumptions in respect of 
performance, returns, costs and charges) with a reasonable prospect 
of being met under current circumstances; 
(bb)  make it clear that they are not guaranteed and are provided for 
illustrative purposes only; and 
(cc)  also contain, where returns or benefits are dependent on the 
performance of underlying assets or other variable market factors, 
clear indications of such dependence; 
(iii) a warning statement about risks involved in buying or selling a 
financial product, prominently render or display such statement; and 
(iv) information about past performances, also contain a warning that past 
performances are not necessarily indicative of future performances; 
and 
(c)  if the investment value of a financial product mentioned in the 
advertisement is no guaranteed, contain a warning that no guarantees 
are provided. 
(2) Where a provider advertises a financial service by telephone- 
(a) an electronic, voicelogged record of all communications must be 
maintained. Where no financial service is rendered as a result of the 
advertisement, such record need not be maintained for a period 
exceeding 45 days; 
(b) a copy of all such records must be provided on request by the client or 
the registrar within seven days of the request; 
(c) all the information required by sections 4(1)(a) and (c) and 5(a) and 
(c) shall not be required: Provided that the client is provided with basic 
details (such as business name and telephone number or address) of 
the provider or relevant product supplier, and of their relevant 
compliance departments: Provided further that, if the promotion 
results in the rendering of a financial service, the full details required 
by those sections are provided to the client in writing within 30 days of 
the relevant interaction with the client. 
(3) Where a provider advertises a financial service by means of a public 
radio service, the advertisement must include the business name of 
the provider. 
This proves that existing law in many cases already contains principles of 
fairness.  
Advice and point of sale may constitute different stages in the product life-
cycle, but more than often these two stages are one and the same thing. 
"Advice" is already defined in section 1 of the FAIS Act, and this particular 
statute is very clear on the way in which advice should be furnished. In 
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addition to these statutory obligations, there are common law rules 
pertaining to contract and specifically the duties of insurance brokers that 
essentially aim to protect the interests of prospective policyholders, 
thereby enhancing fairness. The duty of a broker to perform the mandate 
personally, to act with care and skill, and to act in good faith are some of 
the common law duties that still exist.88 The GCC contains quite a number 
of detailed rules that stipulate how an advisor and intermediary should 
conduct himself.  
Information after point of sale is the second last stage in the product life-
cycle. It is submitted that during this stage, it is either the insurer and the 
policyholder's relationship that is under scrutiny, in which case the LTIA or 
STIA and the respective Policyholder Protection Rules (PPR) in terms of 
each apply, or it is the relationship between an insurance broker and a 
client that is relevant, for instance where the broker continues to render 
ongoing services. In the latter instance the FAIS Act applies. There are a 
number of rules that may be identified in terms of the LTIA, STIA and FAIS 
Act that may apply and that exist to protect the policyholder. For instance, 
rule 7.4 of the PPR's terms of both the LTIA and the STIA deal with time 
bar clauses and contain specific provisions on the periods within which a 
claim can be brought and the time within which a dissatisfied policyholder 
may bring an action against an insurer. There are many other examples 
that cannot be discussed here. 
The matter of bringing an action brings us to the final stage in the product 
life-cycle, namely complaints handling. Part XI of the GCC in terms of the 
FAIS Act already specifies that the FSP should have an internal dispute 
resolution system.89 These and other rules are aimed at treating the 
customer fairly. 
Overall, it is clear that existing common law rules and legislation provide 
policyholders with a variety of rights. It is suggested that fairness is 
already infused in insurance legislation, and although there are areas such 
as credit insurance and onerous terms in insurance contracts that need 
reform, TCF throughout the product life-cycle is not really anything new. 
Conclusion 
The activities of insurers, intermediaries and advisors over the past year 
reveal the many issues and complexities that make up insurance 
                                            
88  Havenga Law of Insurance Intermediaries 3-4. 
89  See s 19 of the GCC for the specific obligations. 
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business. Insurance as a financial product is complex and, as was seen in 
the FAIS Ombud and Enforcement Committee cases, there is a definite 
need to promote and enhance consumer protection. It is anybody's guess, 
however, whether more bureaucratic arrangements as per the FSR Bill will 
in fact achieve this objective. 
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